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that under our law the purpose of the picketing here involved
is not unlawful or that the court is applying the federal law
only because interstate commerce is affected.
The judgment should be reversed.
Gibson. C. J ., and Traynor, J ., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December
28, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22750.

In Bank.

Dec. 2, 1955.]

CHARLES H. BENTON, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent,
v. PAINTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 333 et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Federal Boards-Jurisdiction.-Where an employer's

business affects interstate commerce, in the first instance,
jurisdiction of its controversy with labor unions vests exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board.
[2) Id.- Federal Boar1s- Jurisdiction.-Where an employer's
petition for a determination of representation was dismissed
by the National Labor Relations Board on the ground that
the unions named in the petition did not claim to represent
the unit of employees for which petitioner sought an election,
this was not a refusal to take jurisdiction, but only a declaration that petitioner was not entitled to an election under the
provisions of the statute.
[3] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-A general pronouncement of the National Labor Relations Board that it will
exercise jurisdiction only in cases in which the employer's
business in interstate commerce exceeds a certain minimum
amount is not sufficient automatically to confer jurisdiction
on a state court where an employer's operations do not come
up to that minimum.
[4] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-In an action
against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover damages, the
state court has jurisdiction to award damages to the employer if the evidence shows that it is entitled to them under
state law.
[1] See Am.Jur., Labor, § 145.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8] Labor, § 1a; [3, 4, 6, 7] Labor
§ 24; [5, 9] Labor, § 20a; [10] Labor,§ 21.
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[5] !d.-Unions-Economic Pressure Aetivities.-Independently of
rights given under the federal statutes, under California decisions an employer may not obtain relief from economic
pressure asserted in an effort to compel him to sign a union
shop agreement.
[6] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Oourts.-Although the
state court may enforce rights given by federal statutes to
the parties to a labor dispute through the traditional tort
remedies of injunctioL and damages, it may not assume jurisdiction of the controversy unless the National Labor Relations Board has declined to act.
[7] Id.-Remedies.-An employer may not obtain relief in a state
court from the acts of unions in inducing a roofers' union to
breach its contract by calling a strike, an activity which
under California law unaffected by federal legislation is privileged. (See Lab. Code, § 1126.)
[8] !d.-Applicability of Federal Law.-Where an employer's
roofing business does not affect interstate commerce, the federal law relating to labor-management controversies is not
applicable.
[9] !d.-Unions-Closed Shop.-A closed shop agreement is not
invalid under California laws.
[10] !d.-Strikes-Purpose of No-Strike Agreement.-The purpose
of a no-strike agreement is industrial peace between the
parties thereto, and its terms bind the employer not to lock
out the employees for any reason and the union not to interrupt the employer's business by labor difficulties; it is not
restricted to disputes arising out of the contractual provisions
for wages, hours and working conditions.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. John A. Hewicker, ,Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Action against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover
damages. Judgment for plaintiff reversed as to defendant
truckers' and painters' unions and affirmed as to defendant
roofers' union.
P. H. McCarthy, Jr., F. Nason O'Hara and Herbert S .
.Johnson for appellants Painters Local Union No. 333 and
United Slate. Tile & Composition Roofer~ TJocal No. 45.
Thomas Whelan for appellant Building Materials & Dump
'rruck Drivers Local No. 36.
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer and Ward W.
Waddell, Jr., for Respondent.
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EDMONDS, J .-The questions presented in this case are
substantially the same as those decided in Garmon v. San
Diego Bldg. Trades Counc£l, ante, p. 657 (291 P.2d 1).
Here, as in the Garmon case, the appeal is from a judgment
enjoining the unions from engaging in certain activities and
a warding the employer damages.
The findings of fact may be summarized as follows :
Charles H. Benton, Inc., is a California corporation whose
business is the mixing and selling of paint and paint supplies
in interstate commerce. It is also engaged in the roofing
business, but no express finding was made that this phase
of the business did or did not affect interstate commerce.
The painters' and truck drivers' unions advised the company that they intended to organize its employees in the
paint business. Thereafter, on several occasions, they presented a proposed contract which included a provision that
"the employer hereby agrees that the above listed Unions
shall be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all employees. It is further agreed that new employees, not already
members of the unions, shall, within thirty days, become and
remain members of tl1e Union as a condition of continued
employment." The company refused to enter into the contract, asserting that it would be illegal for it to do so unless
and until its employees had designated the unions as their
collective bargaining representatives. It requested the unions
to join with it in appropriate steps to ascertain if its employees desired such representation. After negotiations with
union representatives, the employees refused to allow the
unions to act for them. Neither union has been recognized
by the National Labor Relations Board as the representative
of the employees.
The two unions then picketed plaintiff's place of business.
'rhe picketing was intended to compel the employer "by
means of pressure brought upon plaintiff's business through
defendant" roofers' union and plaintiff's roofer employees
''by the refusal" of thost> employees "to continue employment" while the pickt>ts were maintained and to compel the
company to sign the offered contract "in the belief that if
such a contract is executed and put into effect, the employees
of the plaintiff will join, or be compelled to join, the defendant Unions, and that no unfair labor practice charge will
be filed with the National Labor Relations Board." The
picketing was not intended to educate Benton's employees
or to inform them of the benefits of unionization.
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The roofers' union has caused roofer employees to refuse
to work for the company, and has continued its strike, thereby
disrupting the roofing business to the damage of the company.
There is an existing contract between the roofers' union and
the company with respect to the roofing employees and their
wages, hours and working conditions. This contract provides: "The Employer shall call upon the Union for such
men as he may from time to time need, and the Union shall
furnish the Employer the required number of qualified and
eompetent workmen needed by the Employer, qualifications
and competency to be determined by the Employer. . .. ''
By other provisions the union and the employer agreed "that
there shall be no strikes or lockouts during the life of this
Agreement and that any and all grievances or controversies
which may arise with respect to the interpretation or application shall be settled as hereinafter provided." Any dispute
not settled by a conciliator, appointed by the parties, was to
be referred to a conference board composed of equal representatives of each party, with an additional number if necessary. The roofers' union refused to follow this procedure
in the present controversy.
Upon these findings the court rendered a judgment which
enjoins the unions from picketing the company's place of
business, inducing employees to leave work or doing any other
acts tending to injure the business in order to compel the
company to execute the proffered contract until one of the
two unions has been properly designated as the collective
bargaining agent for the employees. The roofers' union is
enjoined from "inducing any roofers employed by the plaintiff to refuse to work for the plaintiff, or from calling or
inducing any work stoppage among the roofers employed by
the plaintiff, or from refusing to make reasonable efforts to
supply competent roofers to plaintiff upon request, so long
as the contract between plaintiff and said defendant shall
remain in effect, and requiring the said defendant to inform
its members that they will not be discriminated against, fined,
or otherwise disciplined for working for the plantiff." The
judgment also awards damages of $2,243.78 against the
defendants.
As grounds for reversing the judgments the painters' and
truck drivers' unions assert that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin their activities or to award damages against
them, because a labor dispute in a business affecting interstate
commerce is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board. They contend also that they did
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not violate the law of this state. The roofers' union claims
that its contract with the
is illegal under the National Labor Relations Act, and therefore unenforceable by
either party. But it also insists that it did not violate the
collective
that contract.
The company argues that, regardless of federal law, the violaand truckers' unions of California stattion by the
utes vested
courts with ;jurisdiction to enforce them. The
judgment against the roofers' union is said to be justified
because it breached the collective bargaining agreement.
The facts as found by the trial court do not support the
injunction against the painters' union and the truckers'
union. [1] As the employer's paint business affects interstate commerce, in the first instance, jurisdiction of the controversy with the unions vested exclusively in the National
Labor Relations Board. (See Garmon v. San Diego Bldg.
Trades Cmmcil, ante, p. 657 [291 P.2d 1]; Garner v.
Teamsters, Chauffeurs &; Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346
U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228]; Weber v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546].)
[2] The employer's petition for a determination of representation was dismissed by the board upon the ground that
the unions named in the petition did not claim to represent
the unit of employees for which the petitioner sought an
election. This was not a refusal to take jurisdiction, but
only a declaration that the petitioner was not entitled to an
election under the provisions of the act. [3] The general
pronouncement of the national board that it will exercise
jurisdiction only in cases in which the company's business
in interstate commerce exceeds a certain minimum amount
is not sufficient to automatically confer jurisdiction on a state
court where an employer's operations do not come up to that
m1mmum. (l[innard Canst. Co. v. Building Trades Council,
346 U.S. 933 [74 S.Ct. 373, 98 L.Ed. 423] .)
[4] The state court has jurisdiction to award damages to
the employer if the evidence shows that it is entitled to them
under state law. (United Canst. Workers v. Laburnum Canst.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025] .) [5] However, independently of rights given under the federal statutes,
under California decisions an employer may not obtain relief
from economic pressure asserted in an effort to compel him
to sign a union shop agreement. [6] The federal statutes
give the parties to a labor dispute rights in addition to those
afforded by state law. Although the state court may enforce
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those rights through the traditional tort remedies of injunc"
tion and damages (Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council., ante, p. 657 [ 291 P .2d 1] ) , it may not assume
jurisdiction of the controversy unless the National Labor
Relations Board has declined to act. An employer in that
situation is in much the same position as one who has failed
to invoke his administrative remedies. ( Cf. Ge1·ry of Calif.
v. Snperior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 129 [194 P.2d 689] .)
[7] Similarly, the employer may not obtain relief from the
acts of the unions in inducing the roofers' union to breach
its contract, an activity which under California law unaffected
by the federal legislation is privileged. (Imperial Ice Co. v.
Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 35 [112 P.2d 631].)
The court found that the roofers' union breached its contract by calling a strike of the roofing employees and inducing
them to refuse to work for the employer in aid of the campaign of the other two unions. Under the contract, the
roofers' union agrees to furnish employees to Benton and
''that there shall be no strikes or lockouts during the life
of this Agreement and that any and all grievances or controversies which may arise with respect to the interpretation
or application shall be settled'' by arbitration. The employer
covenants that employees shall not be discharged for "recognizing authorized picket lines'' established by any affiliate
of the American Federation of Labor.
''Any collective bargaining agreement between an employer
and a labor organization shall be enforceable at law or in
equity, and a breach of such collective bargaining agreement
by any party thereto shall be subject to the same remedies, including injunctive relief, as are available on other contracts in
the courts of this State.'' (I..~ab. Code, § 1126; see cases collected 2 A.L.R.2d 1278.)
[8, 9] The roofers' union argues that, because of its closed
shop provision, the contract is illegal under the federal law
and hence not enforceable. As to Benton's business, the
court found: ''Plaintiff is . . . engaged in the business of
mixing and selling paint and paint supplies; that during
the year July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952, plaintiff made sales
of its said products in the aggregate amount of approximately
$178,910.10 directly in interstate and foreign commerce; with
respect to the said business plaintiff is engaged in and its
business affects interstate commerce. Plaintiff is and for
several years has been also engaged in the roofing business
in the City of San Diego and neighboring areas within the
County of San Diego, State of California.'' It reasonably
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may be implied from this finding that Benton's roofing business does not affect interstate commerce. The federal law,
therefore, is not applicable, and a closed shop agreement is
not invalid under California laws.
[10] The roofers' union contends, however, that even if
the agreement is enforceable, there has been no breach of it
because the no-strike agreement pertains only to disputes
arising out of the contractual provisions for wages, hours,
and working conditions. The obvious purpose of the contract
is industrial peace between the parties. Its terms, binding
the employer not to lock out the employees for any reason
and the union not to interrupt the employer's business by
labor difficulties, refutes the union's claims as to its rights.
The judgment as to the truckers' and painters' unions is
reversed. As to the roofers' union it is affirmed. Each party
shall bear its own costs on appeal.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in
the conclusion reached by the majority but do not agree
with the reasoning of the majority with respect to the power
of a state court to enforce the provisions of the National
Labor Management Relations Act as announced in Garmon v.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, ante, p. 657 [291 P.2d 1],
and I adopt the views expressed in my dissent in the Garmon
case on this proposition.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J ., concurred.

